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ABSTRACT 
The work of Russell Dalton has undoubtedly played a seminal role in the study of the relation 
between political sophistication and partisan dealignment. We furthermore acknowledge the 
presence of a consensus on the occurrence of lower levels of partisanship in Germany. Using 
panel data as well as pooled cross-sectional observations, however, it is clear that generational 
replacement is not the sole driving force of partisan dealignment, but that period effects 
should also be taken into account. While on an aggregate level rising levels of politica l 
sophistication have occurred simultaneously with decreasing partisanship, individual level 
analysis suggests clearly that the least sophisticated are most likely to feel alienated from the 
party system. We close with some very specific suggestion on how to address the democratic 
consequences of declining levels of partisanship. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It goes without saying that the work of Russell Dalton has had a huge impact on the study of 
partisan dealignment and political sophistication, and indeed, in our earlier article we have 
acknowledged in a number of places our intellectual debt to his work.1 It is equally important 
to note that we agree on the fundamental trend: partisan alignment is clearly eroding in 
Germany and this trend will have important consequences for the future linkage mechanisms 
between German citizens and their political system. While not so long ago scholars still 
questioned the magnitude and importance of electoral change 2 , it is by now generally 
accepted in the field that the process of electoral linkage has changed structurally, and the 
work of Russell Dalton has played an important role in this academic debate.3  
 
We still disagree, however, on two specific research questions. The first question is whether 
dealignment is mainly caused by generational replacement, or whether other elements should 
be taken into account as well? The second, and most fundamental question is to establish the 
likely consequences of dealignment: does it lead to the development of a new group of highly 
sophisticated apartisans4, or is there a risk of political alienation? Although we agree with 
many elements in the excellent article of Russell Dalton, in this rejoinder we briefly explain 
why we continue to disagree on these two crucial questions. 
 
 
2. Age, Period and Cohort 
 
There is no discussion at all about the fact that dealignment is a real trend and it affects the 
German political system. Both our data for the post-1992 period, as well as Dalton’s data 
spanning the period 1972-2009 indicate a clear decline of partisanship in the German 
electorate. As such, both of our analyses are in line with research indicating electoral change 
since the late 1970s. 5  Furthermore, the figures demonstrate that this trend continues 
throughout the most recent period as well. So on a descriptive level, there is a very broad 
consensus on the occurrence of partisan dealignment, as indeed Russell Dalton already stated 
in 1984.6 
 
We disagree, however, on the issue of what time effects are to be discerned underneath this 
aggregate- level trend towards dealignment. According to Dalton, lower levels of partisanship 
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are concentrated among younger age groups, and he assumes that a process of generational 
replacement is driving this observation. While we agree with Dalton that using sophisticated 
analyses is not a goal in itself, and should not be used simply to show off statistical 
sophistication, correctly analysing a process of social change is notoriously difficult and it 
does require appropriate data and methods. The interdependence of age, periods and cohorts 
is one of the oldest problems in social science research and this implies that we cannot easily 
disentangle the three time effects using pooled cross-section data.7 In such a design, pooling 
several independent surveys over time, age and cohorts are basically the same. Given the 
complex character of this social change, we are convinced that the panel data of the SOEP 
that we use are superior in this regard to the cross-sectional election data Dalton uses. Indeed, 
panel date pose new problems with regard to panel attrition and repeated measurement, but 
there is no good theoretical reason to assume that being included in a panel study would have 
a profound effect on reporting partisan attachment. 
 
According to Dalton, the hypothesis about generational replacement is confirmed if young 
people today are less partisan than an older birth cohort was at a similar age and if all age 
groups act in more or less the same way across time. This option, however, rules out the 
possibility to investigate the occurrence of period effects. Additionally, and this is more 
important in this context, there is no room to investigate interactions between age and period, 
which is an equally valid explanation for differences in the proportion of party identifiers 
between younger and older birth cohorts over time. As research by Dalton and others 
convincingly shows, young people today are indeed less partisans than their parents were at 
their age.8 This does not automatically imply, however, that generational replacement is the 
main or only mechanism that is responsible for this observed difference. An interaction 
between age and period effects would be an equally valid explanation. This interaction effect 
would imply that young people today are more strongly influenced by the general and 
periodic decrease in partisanship compared to older citizens. Since this group of young 
citizens is, unlike their parents, not yet “set in their ways”9 by years of continuous voting 
experience, they are more likely to be affected by this period effect. The proportion of 
partisans among the generation of their parents on the other hand, might have been 
exceptionally high at a young age, exactly because they were living in a context of high 
politisation with strong partisanship. As such, the difference observed between young a nd 
older birth cohorts at a young age, should not be automatically attributed to the influence of 
generations or cohorts, as it could just as well be explained by an interaction between age and 
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period effects. Fully understanding this complex process of social change, does require the 
best possible data that we have in order to document these longitudinal trends. 
 
To illustrate his point, Dalton graphically compares the evolution of partisanship over time for 
different age groups (his Figure 1). In Figure 1 we replicate such a graph for the SOEP-data 
and hence for the shorter period 1992-2009. The graph presents the proportion of respondents 
identifying with a party per age group for each of the survey waves. As becomes clear from 
Figure 1, overall there is very little evolution over time, and additionally the gaps in 
proportions of partisans for different age groups as well hardly change over time. This 
graphical presentation of the data therefore indicates that for the period covered in our study 
(1992-2009) interactions between age groups and periods are minimal. The data presented by 
Dalton on the other hand, covering elections since 1972, first and foremost indicate strong 
period effects (see his Figure 1). Furthermore, his data contain indications of interactions 
between age groups and periods. The changes observed, however, seem to be caused mainly 
by a depolitisation of the youngest respondents starting in 1983.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To investigate how partisanship affects different generations, a visual representation as in 
Figure 2 allows for a more straightforward interpretation. In this graph, we track the 
proportion of partisans over time for four broad generations 10, defined on the basis of their 
year of birth. We distinguish the pre-war generation (1910-1930), the silent generation (1931-
1950), the civic generation (1951-1970) and generation x (1971 and later). Unlike Figure 1, 
this graph does indicate some change over time. Members of the youngest generation become 
more partisan as they grow older and acquire political experience. As such, the SOEP-data 
(1992-2009) provide evidence that is in contrast to the stability across time underlying the 
generational hypothesis. As the huge advantage of the SOEP data is that exactly the same data 
are observed across time, we can be convinced that the SOEP surveys are better able to 
capture this process of social change than the data used by Dalton. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It would be a bit too easy, however, to simply say that this is a difference of data, and that 
different data sources simply tell a different story. Therefore, we have tackled the problem 
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head on, by using exactly the same data as Dalton, for the entire period 1972-2009.11 Even 
more strongly so than for the shorter period covered by the SOEP-data, Figure 3 indicates the 
presence of strong period effects, especially in the period between 1975 and 2000. In contrast 
to the assumption of relative stability within generations, the figures indicate a decline of 
partisanship among all generations. For all generations we furthermore observe the same 
period effects. This graph, using the very same data as Dalton is relying on, questions the 
assumption of generational change. Looking at patterns of change in this way, therefore, our 
and Dalton’s data hint in the same direction: all age groups and all cohorts have witnessed a 
dramatic erosion of partisanship. The fact that the SOEP-data suffer from attrition problems 
and the fact that our analyses included respondents from East and from West is therefore 
unlikely to be causing serious distortions. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Our claim therefore quite strongly remains that the decline of partisanship cannot be solely 
attributed to cohort effects or generational replacement.12 These visual assessments and the 
fact that age, period and cohort are linearly dependent, have led us in our original article to a 
focus on age and period effects only. Generational effects are then controlled for by means of 
proxy variables that are likely to be associated to these processes of generational change.13 
This is the reason for the inclusion of variables as religious denomination and trade union 
membership. In this sense, Dalton is absolutely right in pointing out that controlling for these 
factors might explain generational patterns as new age cohorts are e.g. less religious than 
previous cohorts. Given the fact that age, period and cohort are linearly dependent, including 
these proxies for generations is our approach to investigate the impact of these three time-
related variables in a single analysis. Our conclusion therefore does remain that while it is 
likely that cohort mechanisms play a role, it is just as important to assess the contribution of 
period and age effects to this process of social change. While Dalton states that our research 
design prevents us from seeing the forest through the trees, our claim does remain that 
carefully studying trees gives insights on what kind of forest you are talking about. And 
indeed, following exactly the same tree, or respondent, over a longer period of time, which is 
what panel research is there for, is the very best way to investigate social change. 
 
Sophistication or alienation? 
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Our discussion with Dalton, however, is not only based on questions of data and methods of 
analysis, but it also has implications for the much more important point of how the future of 
democratic electoral politics in Germany, and in liberal democracies in general looks like. 
While Dalton assumes that rising political sophistication contributes to electoral dealignment, 
our analyses suggest the contrary, and hint at a risk for political alienation. 
 
As is pointed out by Dalton, one has to take into account processes of change when 
investigating the causes and correlates of partisanship. This is essential, because it is indeed 
possible and even very likely that “the characteristics of independents have changed as their 
numbers have expanded”.14 It is right, therefore, to point out that investigating individual-
level correlations between political interest or education and partisanship does not suffice to 
document these changes. Given that the characteristics that are typically associated with 
partisanship might have changed over time, interactions between these characteristics and 
time have to be investigated. This is exactly what our analyses on the SOEP-data provide. As 
a consequence, our findings not only indicate that high levels of education and high levels of 
interest in politics are associated with partisanship. Our results furthermore point out the link 
between these characteristics and party identification grows stronger between 1992 and 2009, 
as evident from the significant interactions with the survey year. 
 
The fact that panel-data are to be preferred for investigating age, period and cohort effects, 
has led us to rely on the SOEP-data. As a consequence, our analyses cover dealignment in 
Germany since 1992 only. One could obviously argue that the broad patterns of change in 
partisanship and shifts within the electorate have already occurred earlier and that the finding 
that partisanship is now more strongly associated with high levels of political sophistication 
holds for the most recent period only. In order to investigate whether these patterns are robust 
when investigating a longer period of time, we replicated the analyses for the pooled cross-
sectional data of German Elections Studies and Politbarometer surveys used by Dalton as 
well.15 Doing so, we can gain insights in changes in the correlates of partisanship since 1976. 
 
As holds for our investigation of partisanship by means of the SOEP-data, the analyses take 
the form of multivariate logistic regressions. The dependent variable is partisanship, and the 
question wording for this item is identical for both datasets. In line with the analyses on the 
SOEP-panel, as a first step, we present three models in Table 1. 
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Model 1 includes the main and squared effects of age16 and survey year. Furthermore, the 
socio-demographic determinants gender, educational level17 and religious denomination18 are 
included.19 For this analysis, only respondents from the Western Länder are included. In line 
with what the analyses on the SOEP-data pointed out, growing older, being male, being 
higher educated and having a Catholic or Protestant denomination all significantly increase 
the probability of identifying with a political party.  
 
In Model 2 interactions between the socio-demographic variables and election years are 
included. These interaction terms allow assessing whether the impact of these variables on 
having a party identification changes over the period 1976-2009. First, we observe a 
significant interaction between age and election year, indicating an over-time increase of the 
positive effect of age on partisanship. Furthermore, the effect of gender is diminishing. Most 
importantly, however, we can observe an increase of the e ffect of being higher educated on 
identifying with a party. As a consequence, the educational gap between partisans and non-
partisans observed in Model 1 seems to be increasing over time. 
 
The next model (Model 3 in Table 1) additionally includes political interest 20  and its 
interactions with election year and education. As clear from the results, the middle interested 
are significantly more likely to identify with a party compared to the low interested and the 
high interested even more so. For the full period covered by these data (1976-2009), 
therefore, it is safe to conclude that partisanship is associated with high levels of political 
interest. Furthermore, allowing changing effects by means of interactions with time, indicates 
that the effect of political interest increases over time. This interaction effect and the robust 
significant interaction effect of higher education and time indicate a strengthening of the link 
between being highly politically sophisticated and identifying with a political party. Unlike 
what Dalton claims, therefore, and in contrast to what aggregate- level trends seem to suggest, 
the politically sophisticated are more likely to identify with a party and even more so now 
than was the case a number of decades ago.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results of Model 4 furthermore indicate that the differences observed between the 
aggregate- level evidence presented by Dalton (his Table 2) and our multivariate analyses are 
not due to differences in operationalizations either. In this model, rather than including 
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education and political interest and their interactions with time separately, we rely on an index 
of cognitive mobilization. This index replicates how Dalton operationalizes cognitive 
mobilization, combining political interest and levels of education. 21  The results of this 
analysis as well indicate that cognitive mobilization increases the likelihood of identifying 
with a party (the significant and positive main effect) and even more so as time proceeds (the 
significant and positive interaction effect with time). 
 
Despite some differences in directions and significance levels of the predictors of 
partisanship, the main conclusion of our analysis on the SOEP-data holds for the data used by 
Dalton as well. Being higher educated and being highly interested in politics significantly 
increase the probability of being a partisan. Furthermore and more importantly, these effects 
grow stronger over time. As a consequence, both datasets provide indications that the gap in 
political sophistication between partisans and apartisans is increasing over time. Neither a 
reliance on panel-data or the inclusion of citizens living in the East of Germany, nor a focus 
on the most recent period only can therefore explain differences between our conclusion and 
Dalton’s interpretation. The only difference left is therefore that Dalton looks at trends at the 
aggregate level, while we try to disentangle individual- level mechanisms. At a societal level, 
there is no doubt that rising education and decreasing partisanship have occurred 
simultaneously. This aggregate level observation, however, does not yet lead to any insights 
on individual level mechanisms. Despite these broad social changes, it is still possible that 
especially the least politically sophisticated are most strongly affected by processes of 
partisan dealignment. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In this rejoinder, we have taken up some of the thought-provoking ideas of Russell Dalton. 
First of all, we have shown that, no matter what kind of data are being used, and what kind of 
method of analysis is relied on, it is clear that cohort effects are not the sole factor driving the 
process of dealignment. This is an important insight, as it allows us to depart from the outlook 
on value change in political science, that has dominated this field ever since Inglehart first put 
forward the generational replacement idea now more than four decades ago. While of course 
it has to be acknowledged that cohorts differ, we should also pay more attention to period 
effects. This is also very important in order to determine our future research strategy. The 
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claim about generational replacement is intuitively attractive, because it leads to an almost 
deterministic view on social and political change. The only thing scholars and decision 
makers have to do is to lean back and wait until new age cohorts have arrived, and this will 
lead to societal change. The fact that period effects might be equally important, however, 
forces us to think about what kind of factors are responsible for these period effects. Specific 
elements of the political system, or the party system might have changed, with as a result 
different linkage systems between citizens and the political system. This kind of period effects 
should receive more attention in future research. 
 
Most fundamentally, however, we disagree about the relation between political sophistication 
and partisan dealignment. This is of crucial importance. To put it all too simple: if there is a 
positive relation, we should not worry at all about dealignment. In that case, the most 
enlightened and best informed citizens indeed will try to make an informed party choice, and 
this should force political parties to respond more sharply to the preferences of the population. 
In that case, dealignment would be something positive from the point of view of democratic 
accountability and result in the rise of ideal-type democracies. Most likely, this process is 
taking place in a two party-system like the United States where there are few viable 
alternatives than becoming apartisans for sophisticated voters who do not identify with one of 
the two major parties. But in multiparty systems, voters have more options so that even highly 
sophisticated voters are quite likely to find a political party that corresponds closely to their 
own political preferences. We agree with Dalton in noticing that one of the most profound 
changes in Western societies during the past decades has been the rise of education levels, and 
hence the rise in political sophistication. As simultaneously partisan alignment has decreased, 
it is only natural to assume a relation between both processes. Our individual level data, 
however, suggest otherwise: it are the least politically sophisticated who are likely to feel 
alienated from the party system. 
 
To end on a constructive note: we also have to acknowledge some limitiations of this kind of 
research on partisanship. We could go on confronting research methods and methods of 
analysis, but this is probably not the best way forward for political science. Basically our 
predictions are different. If Dalton is right (and we have to acknowledge that he has been right 
so often during the past decades), the apartisans should be sophisticated, and therefore their 
party preference should rely on ‘sophisticated’ considerations, like ideology, party programs, 
individual preferences, strategic voting, and adequate political information. If all these kind of 
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voting motives do replace the traditional role of partisan identity in the vote choice process, 
we will have to agree with Dalton that our electoral process has been enriched and will lead to 
more democratic accountability. If, on the other hand, apartisanship and electoral volatility 
are concentrated among the least sophisticated, we would expect voting motives like media 
and campaign effects and politicians’ personality to become ever more important. The study 
of voting motives and volatility therefore, would allow gaining new insights into the question 
what are the real determinants and consequences of partisan dealignment. This is an important 
question because of its implication for the future of democracy. We fully agree with Dalton: 
partisanship has declined as a voting motive. The question that remains however is: what has 
replaced partisanship? Is it a sophisticated assessment of party positions? Or is it a superficial 
reliance on media and personality effects? Answering this empirical question should shed 
more light on the difference between the position of Russell Dalton and our own position. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of party identifiers by age group (SOEP, 1992-2009) 
 
 
Figure 2. . Proportion of party identifiers by generation (SOEP, 1992-2009) 
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Figure 3. Proportion of party identifiers by generation (GES and Politbarometer, 1972-
2009) 
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Table 1. Explaining party identification (GES and Politbarometer data, 1976-2009) 
 Model 1 
B (SE) Sig 
Model 2 
B (SE) Sig. 
Model 3 
B (SE) Sig. 
Model 4 
B (SE) Sig. 
Age 0.033 (0.012) ** 0.019 (0.015) ns 0.011 (0.014) ns 0.019 (0.016) ns 
Age2 -0.000 (0.000) ns -0.000 (0.002) ns -0.000 (0.000) ns -0.000 (0.000) ns 
Election year -0.093 (0.018) *** -0.110 (0.019) *** -0.128 (0.018) *** -0.108 (0.018) *** 
Election year2 0.001 (0.000) ** 0.001 (0.000) ** 0.002 (0.000) ** 0.001 (0.000) ** 
Age*Election year  0.001 (0.000) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 0.000 (0.000) *** 
Male 0.105 (0.043) *  0.383 (0.083) *** 0.201 (0.084) * 0.334 (0.088) *** 
Male*Election year  -0.011 (0.003) *** -0.009 (0.003) ** -0.011 (0.003) *** 
Education (ref: Middle)     
Low -0.200 (0.044) *** -0.243 (0.142) ns -0.025 (0.158) ns  
High 0.240 (0.068) *** -0.348 (0.122) ** -0.290 (0.149) ns  
Low*Election year  0.001 (0.005) ns 0.004 (0.005) ns  
High*Election year  0.022 (0.004) *** 0.026 (0.005) ***  
Religious denomination (ref: 
other/none) 
    
Catholic 0.217 (0.035) *** 0.266 (0.189) ns 0.350 (0.174) * 0.319 (0.194) ns 
Protestant 0.188 (0.023) *** 0.122 (0.096) ns 0.164 (0.089) ns 0.170 (0.098) ns 
Catholic*Election year  -0.002 (0.006) ns -0.005 (0.006) ns -0.003 (0.006) ns 
Protestant*Election year  0.003 (0.003) ns 0.001 (0.003) ns 0.001 (0.003) ns 
Political interest  (ref: low)     
Middle    0.437 (0.097) ***  
High   1.018 (0.056) ***  
Middle interest*Election year   0.013 (0.003) ***  
High interest*Election year   0.011 (0.002) ***  
Political interest*Low education   -0.133 (0.044) **  
Political interest*High education   -0.207 (0.030) ***  
High cognitively mobilized (ref: low)    0.401 (0.096) *** 
High cognitively mobilized*Election 
year 
   0.008 (0.003) * 
Constant 0.732 (0.200) *** 1.270 (0.319) *** 1.064 (0.294) *** 0.957 (0.345) ** 
Log likelihood -12,334.040 12,304.344 -12,055.170 -12,204.954 
Pseudo-R2 0.036 0.038 0.058 0.046 
Data: GES 1976, GES 1980, Politbarometer 1983, 1988, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2009. Standard errors are corrected for election-clusters. Sig: ns p ≥ 0.05; * p < 0.05; ** p < 
0.01; *** p < 0.001. N = 20,574.  
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